Most of the discussion surrounding the Seattle Seahawks’ final offensive play is about the call itself, whether or not it was a mistake to pass the ball on second and goal.
I’d like to show you why the play that was called didn’t work.
Here’s what it looked like before the snap, and what the Seahawks were trying to get. They wanted Ricardo Lockette to run a slant, with Jermaine Kearse’s route providing a natural pick element to make sure New England Patriots cornerback Malcolm Butler couldn’t undercut the route.
It’s easy to know what the Seahawks wanted on the play, because they ran basically the same concept for a touchdown in Week 3 against the Denver Broncos.
The personnel and formation are different. But the concept is the same. Marshawn Lynch ran basically the same route Lockette did in the Super Bowl. Tight end Zach Miller’s route picked off Lynch’s defender and Lynch was wide open.
In my opinion Wilson expected to hit Lockette for a walk-in touchdown, just like the Lynch play. I think Lockette felt the same way. I think this play was put in the game plan against a specific defensive look.
And Butler simply made a great play, with a big assist from Brandon Browner.
Kearse’s route was supposed to prevent Butler from under-cutting the throw. But Browner did a tremendous job jamming him at the line. Then Butler makes a decisive play to jump the route. Butler read the play based on the formation. It’s outstanding formation and play recognition from a backup, especially a rookie.
Basically, Lockette and Wilson weren’t expecting Butler to be there. The play was designed to get Lockette open. But Browner did his job, and Butler didn’t hesitate.
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Offensively, the Patriots passed the ball 50 times, often with short, quick passes. Of Tom Brady’s 50 passes, 37 traveled less than 10 yards in the air from the line of scrimmage. He was 31-of-37 for 220 yards and two touchdowns on those throws. That negated the Seahawks’ pass rush that can be so effective, and was the biggest reason they won the Super Bowl the previous year against the Denver Broncos.
Seattle switched up its coverages; 31 snaps of zone and 19 of man coverage. New England had some great concepts against both defenses that worked for big plays.
On Brandon LaFell’s 11-yard touchdown, the first score of the game, it was a great route concept against “Cover 3” zone. The slot receiver Julian Edelman ran a quick out. That widened the cornerback Byron Maxwell, and that opened a passing lane to LaFell on a quick slant. The shotgun “power” play action held linebacker Bobby Wagner just enough for Brady to have a window to throw it to LaFell.
It’s a good example of multiple pieces in a play working together to get a receiver open.
Danny Amendola’s 4-yard touchdown in the fourth quarter was another example of combination routes working to get a receiver open for a score. Edelman came from the inside slot and he crossed the face of safety Earl Thomas. That caused Thomas to stop for just a beat. That gave Brady just enough time to make the throw to Amendola, because Thomas was just a little bit late.
Brady surgically beat the Seahawks. He was 13-of-15 for 124 yards and two touchdowns on their final two scoring drives. The defining element of this game was the Seahawks’ inability to generate any consistent pressure on Brady. The Patriots’ game plan was structured to minimize and eliminate it. They executed that plan very well.
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NFL analyst and NFL Films senior producer Greg Cosell watches as much NFL game film as anyone. Throughout the season, Cosell will join Shutdown Corner to share his observations on the teams, schemes and personnel from around the league.
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